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ALT LABOR? WHY WE STILL NEED TRADITIONAL LABOR 
MARTIN H. MALIN*
INTRODUCTION
The United States’ workplace is characterized by income inequality, 
and there is strong evidence that the decline of collective bargaining has 
played a significant role in that phenomenon.1 There is also strong evidence 
that U.S. workers are experiencing a significant voice gap, i.e., a significant 
difference between the level of influence they believe they should have 
with respect to conditions at their workplaces and the level of influence 
they actually do have.2 In a major study of workers’ perceptions of their 
jobs, only 40% reported they were in good jobs, where job quality was 
measured by ten characteristics that employees generally cite as qualities 
they desire in their jobs.3 Of course, union representation and collective 
bargaining have been the traditional methods for providing workers a voice 
in their workplaces and improving the quality of their jobs. As the percent-
age of American workers represented by labor unions has steadily de-
clined,4 attention has turned to alternatives to traditional unions and 
collective bargaining. Labor Educator Steven Ashby describes the devel-
opment: 
As traditional unions have increasingly come under attack over the past 
several decades, new organizations labeled “alt labor” have emerged – 
workers’ rights organizations that have similar goals but different struc-
* Professor and Co-director, Institute for Law and the Workplace, Chicago-Kent College of Law, 
Illinois Institute of Technology. I gratefully acknowledge helpful comments from Robert Bruno and 
Céasar Rosado Marzán, and helpful research assistance from Chicago-Kent reference librarian Mandy 
Lee. 
 1.  See Bruce Western & Jake Rosenfeld, Unions, Norms and the Rise in U.S. Wage Inequality,
76 AM. SOC. REV. 513, 513 (2011). 
 2.  Thomas A. Kochan et al., Worker Voice in America: Is There a Gap between What Workers 
Expect and What They Experience?, 72 INDUS. & LAB. REL. REV. 3, 3 (2019). 
 3.  JONATHAN ROTHWELL & STEVEN CRABTREE, NOT JUST A JOB: NEW EVIDENCE ON THE 
QUALITY OF WORK IN THE UNITED STATES (2019), https://www.gallup.com/file/education/267650/Not 
%20Just%20a%20Job%20New%20Evidence%20on%20the%20Quality%20of%20Work%20in%20the
%20United%20States.pdf [https://perma.cc/2KP6-8TUC]. 
 4.  In 2018, 10.5% of the wage and salaried workforce were members of unions and 11.7% were 
represented by unions, down by 0.2% from 2017. BUREAU OF LABOR STATS., NEWS RELEASE, U.S.
DEP’T LABOR, https://www.bls.gov/news.release/pdf/union2.pdf [https://perma.cc/XJ79-7CDZ]. Union 
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tures and methods than organized labor. At the core of alt-labor are more 
than two hundred worker centers, which have been active for more than 
two decades championing the rights of mostly immigrant workers and 
launching a national conversation about wage theft and how to fight it. 
Other alt-labor formations include labor-community coalitions, immi-
grant community-based workers’ organizations, faith-based worker 
rights organizations, and worker-based racial civil rights organizations. 
As well, the Fight for Fifteen movement, while funded and staffed by a 
traditional union (the Service Employees International Union), has built 
a low-wage worker movement that embodies the characteristics and tac-
tics of alt-labor groups.5
 Indeed, it appears that many have simply given up on traditional busi-
ness unionism and collective bargaining. Labor economist Richard Free-
man, coauthor of the enormously influential What Do Unions Do?, has 
written: 
The starting point for any realistic assessment of what labor organiza-
tions can do for American workers is recognition that the traditional un-
ion model of organizing workers through representation elections and 
bargaining collectively with management has reached a dead end. With 
private-sector union density in single digits and falling and public sector 
collective bargaining under attack, the only sensible answer to this chap-
ter’s title question [what can labor organizations do for U.S. workers 
when unions can’t do what unions used to do?] is that unions will not ac-
complish much unless they find ways to have an impact on economic 
outcomes outside of collective bargaining.6
 Similarly, Jonathan Rosenblum, who served as director of SEIU’s 
Sea-Tac Airport campaign, the first successful action to gain a $15 per hour 
minimum wage, has written that “the union movement as it currently exists 
isn’t capable of building and sustaining the kind of power needed in to-
day’s economic and political reality.”7 Rosenblum cites four reasons for his 
dire analysis: the continuing decline in union density, the limited vision and 
outmoded structure of the business unionism model, a collective bargaining 
model that no longer meets the needs of a growing portion of the work-
force, and narrow union focus limited to workplace issues.8 Labor Law 
scholars Marion Crain and Ken Matheny reacted to the Supreme Court’s 
 5.  Steven Ashby, “Traditional” and “Alt” Labor: Comparisons, Critiques and Perspectives, 43 
LAB. STUDIES J. 101, 101 (2018).
 6.  Richard B, Freeman, What Can Labor Organizations Do for U.S. Workers When Unions 
Can’t Do What They Used to Do?, in WHAT WORKS FOR WORKERS? PUBLIC POLICIES AND 
INNOVATIVE STRATEGIES FOR LOW-WAGE WORKERS 50, 50 (Stephanie Luce et al. eds. 2014). 
 7.  JONATHAN ROSENBLUM, BEYOND $15: IMMIGRANT WORKERS, FAITH ACTIVISTS, AND THE 
REVIVAL OF THE LABOR MOVEMENT 174 (2017). 
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decision in Janus v. AFSCME Council 319 by calling for the rejection of 
the traditional model of business unionism, where unions negotiate and 
administer a collective bargaining agreement for a bargaining unit, in 
which they serve as exclusive representative, and a return to what they 
view as labor’s historically overt political identity.10
This article is a plea to not abandon traditional business unionism. I 
argue that traditional business unionism produces significant benefits for 
workers and society that alternate forms of labor representation are unable 
to do. In Part II, I focus on Crain and Matheny’s call for unions to focus on 
overtly political activism as opposed to business unionism. I argue that the 
approach does not address the inherent disadvantages that workers in the 
public sector face and that traditional business unionism remedies. In Part 
III, I focus on the benefits that traditional labor brings for workers and so-
ciety. In Part IV, I examine so-called alt labor, particularly worker centers. 
I find that worker centers perform very important roles, particularly for the 
lowest-wage immigrant workers, but are not a substitute for traditional 
labor. I conclude that we still need traditional labor, even in its current 
weakened state and should not abandon the conversation as to how to 
strengthen traditional unions. In Part V, I address the question whether 
there is a way forward. 
II. SHOULD LABOR ESCHEW EXCLUSIVE REPRESENTATION AND 
RETURN TO ITS POLITICAL ROOTS?
Crain and Matheny decry that labor has become molded into a role of 
transactional service provider by our system of labor law. They lament the 
decline of the Knights of Labor and the Industrial Workers of the World 
who were unabashedly political and ideological in organizing to protect 
workers by directly challenging the capitalist system.11 They view the 
Wagner Act as channeling unions into service models where they negotiate 
and enforce contracts limited to the workers who have, by majority vote, 
opted to make them their exclusive representatives and as covering those 
workers’ immediate economic interests in wages and working conditions, 
rather than broader interests in social justice.12
 9.  138 S. Ct. 2448 (2018). 
 10.  Marrion C. Crain & Ken Matheny, Unions, Solidarity, and Money, 22 EMP. RTS. & EMP.
POL’Y J. 259, 263–64 (2018). 
 11.  Id. at 265–66. 
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They urge that the Janus Court was correct in characterizing all public 
sector collective bargaining as political13 and suggest that the characteriza-
tion is not limited to the public sector.14 They critique exclusive representa-
tion, suggesting that members-only representation will result in a more 
engaged membership and arguing that exclusive representation inhibits 
innovation, prevents the establishment of new worker organizations pre-
senting issues of interest to particular groups of workers, exacerbates free 
rider and collective action problems, and prevents unions from getting a 
foothold before they gain majority support.15 They point to the successful 
2018 strike by teachers in West Virginia as evidence that unions can make 
broad gains operating outside the law through self-mobilization and overt 
political appeals that garner large scale public support.16
Rather than illustrate that public sector unions’ route to success is to 
operate outside the traditional labor relations legal framework, the West 
Virginia teachers’ strike illustrates why that framework is needed. As 
Clyde Summers articulated forty-five years ago, members of the general 
public are the people who consume and pay for the services provided by 
public employees. Members of the general public desire more and better 
services at lower costs. Public employees seeking improved wages and 
working conditions through the broader political process are at an inherent 
disadvantage because they are outnumbered by the general public whose 
economic interests are directly contrary to the workers.17 As Summers sub-
sequently articulated it, “[p]ublic employees are always at risk that the 
political demands for low taxes and more service will be placated at their 
expense.”18 A legal regime of exclusive representation and a duty to bar-
gain helps level that otherwise unequal playing field. Viewed in this con-
text, a public employee strike directly affects the parties who use and pay 
for the employees’ services. This can cause the users and payers to reevalu-
ate the political calculation of keeping taxes low by paying workers less in 
light of the direct effects of the loss of those workers’ services.19
The West Virginia teachers’ strike illustrates Summers’ points perfect-
ly. For many years, elected officials were able to satisfy the public’s desire 
 13.  Id. at 277. 
 14.  Id.
 15.  Id. at 284–86. 
 16.  Id. at 289–92. 
 17.  Clyde W. Summers, Public Employee Bargaining: A Political Perspective, 83 YALE L.J. 
1156, 1159 (1974). 
 18.  Clyde Summers, Bargaining in the Government’s Business: Principles and Politics, 18 
TOLEDO L. REV. 265, 268 (1987). 
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to keep taxes low by making their teachers the fourth worst paid in the 
country (ranking 48th in average teacher pay).20 Forced to confront the val-
ue of the teachers’ services, the state legislature and governor agreed to 
raise teacher salaries by 5%.21
Teacher strikes in other “red” states had varying success. In Arizona, a 
2018 threat to strike brought a promise by the governor of a 20% raise by 
2020. The teachers struck anyway but failed to gain more.22 In Oklahoma, 
elected officials cut taxes year after year resulting in reductions in school 
funding that caused some school districts to move to a four-day school 
week and teachers who went ten years without a pay increase.23 Teacher 
salaries ranked 50th in the country at the time.24 The threat of a strike pro-
duced raises of $6,000 for teachers and $1,200 for support staff but the 
actual strike failed to gain more.25 In Kentucky, a state-wide teacher strike 
failed to reverse significant cuts to the teachers’ pension benefits.26
Thus, the success of the strikes was uneven. They also resulted in con-
siderable political backlash.27 Moreover, how sustainable the mobilization 
campaigns are, absent formal exclusive representation collective bargaining 
rights, is open to question. It is not likely that most employees want to be 
 20.  See Lauren Peace, In West Virginia the Politicians Fail and the Teachers Rise, N.Y. TIMES
(Mar. 3, 2018), https://www.nytimes.com/2018/03/03/opinion/west-virginia-teachers-strike.html? 
action=click&module=RelatedCoverage&pgtype=Article&region=Footer [https://perma.cc/PPL2-
GRXE]. 
 21.  See Jess Bidgood, West Virginia Raises Teachers’ Pay to End State-wide Strike, N.Y. TIMES
(Mar. 6, 2018), https://www.nytimes.com/2018/03/06/us/west-virginia-teachers-strike-deal.html? 
auth=login-email&login=email [https://perma.cc/6J6B-S3EF]. 
 22.  Joseph Flaherty, The Teachers Won, PHOENIX NEW TIMES (May 8, 2018, 7:30 AM), 
https://www.phoenixnewtimes.com/news/the-teachers-won-how-arizonas-strike-unfolded-10403354 
[https://perma.cc/A7GG-E2WR]. 
 23.  Alexia Fernandez Campbell & Kainaz Amaria, Oklahoma Teachers Are Protesting Ten Years 
of Low Pay: Here’s What Their Walkout Looked Like, VOX (Apr. 3, 2018), https://www.vox.com/ 
policy-and-politics/2018/4/3/17191082/oklahoma-teachers-protest-pay [https://perma.cc/NFA9-24YE]. 
 24.  Frederick M. Hess, Year of the Strike, NAT’L REV. (Oct. 11, 2018) 
https://www.nationalreview.com/magazine/2018/10/29/year-of-the-strike/ [https://perma.cc/MJW8-
ZWFA]. 
 25.  See Dana Goldstein & Elizabeth Dias, Oklahoma Teachers End Walkout After Winning 
Raises and Additional Funding, N.Y. TIMES (Apr. 12, 2018), https://www.nytimes.com/2018/04/12 
/us/oklahoma-teachers-strike.html [https://perma.cc/6KZN-SK62]. 
 26.  Cory Turner, Teacher Walkouts: A State By State Guide, NPR (Apr. 25, 2018, 2:16 PM), 
https://www.npr.org/sections/ed/2018/04/25/602859780/teacher-walkouts-a-state-by-state-guide 
[https://perma.cc/4XMC-FPR9]. 
 27.  See Justin Roth, A Year After Teacher Strikes, Some Lawmakers Ready for Fight, WTVQ 
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continuously mobilized for political or class-based fights. The Knights of 
Labor and the IWW are hardly models of sustainable success.28
Many issues that affect the quality of day-to-day working life are 
simply not amenable to political mobilization. Indeed, a second reason for 
public employee collective bargaining urged by Summers is “to protect 
employees against bureaucratic controls which generate disagreeable work-
ing conditions and permit oppressive arbitrary action—essentially condi-
tions of which the electorate is uninformed and largely unconcerned.”29
Dealing with alleged arbitrary denials of personal days, the distribution of 
overtime and resolving conflicts among employees who wish to take the 
same vacation days are the meat and potatoes of service-oriented business 
unionism that Crain and Matheny urge a move away from. Yet, it is that 
service orientation that can significantly improve employees’ daily working 
lives. Indeed, there is evidence that when a union shifts too much of its 
resources away from servicing the membership and toward organizing 
outside the bargaining unit, the union tends to lose the trust of its mem-
bers.30
Unions add value to the provision of public services by serving as a 
vehicle for employee voice. High performance workplaces, where workers 
have a say in their employer’s efficient operations and the craft, artistic, or 
professional aspects of their work are more efficient than traditional work-
places, and unionized high-performance workplaces outperform their non-
union counterparts.31 Examples of how public sector unions and employers 
have partnered to bring about dramatic improvements in public services 
abound in the federal government, public education, public libraries and 
elsewhere.32 And workers place a high value on having vehicles for their 
voices to be heard.33 Elsewhere, I have proposed legal reforms that would 
codify and institutionalize the exclusive bargaining representative’s role as 
a vehicle for worker voice beyond traditional mandatory subjects of bar-
gaining.34 Serving as a vehicle for worker voice in labor-management part-
 28.  But see Noam Scheiber, The Radical Guidebook Embraced by Google Workers and Uber 
Drivers, N.Y. TIMES (Oct. 10, 2019), https://www.nytimes.com/2019/10/10/business/economy/labor-
book.html [https://perma.cc/XAB4-SAHA]. 
 29.  Summers, supra note 18, at 272. 
 30.  See LAURA ARIOVICH, ORGANIZING THE ORGANIZED (2010). 
 31.  See Ann C. Hodges & Martin H. Malin, Public Sector Innovations: Valuing Voice, in THE 
CAMBRIDGE HANDBOOK OF U.S. LABOR LAW FOR THE 21ST CENTURY 64, 70 (Richard Bales & Char-
lotte Garden eds. 2019).
 32.  Id. at 70–72. 
 33.  See Kochan et al., supra note 2. 
 34.  Martin H. Malin, Collective Representation and Employee Voice in the United States Public 
Sector Workplace: Looking North for Solutions?, 50 OSGOODE HALL L.J. 903, 903 (2013); Martin H. 
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nerships is consistent with the traditional model of business unionism but 
cannot be done successfully without engaging the membership. Publicizing 
how such successful partnerships have improved public services may help 
defeat attacks on workers collective bargaining rights. It is a path forward 
that should be pursued. 
III. WHAT TRADITIONAL UNIONS STILL DO
In their classic 1984 work, What Do Unions Do?, economists Richard 
Freeman and James Medoff found twelve key effects of labor unions.35
Unionization produces a union wage premium resulting from the union’s 
monopoly status as the exclusive bargaining representative, particularly for 
less educated, younger, and junior workers and in heavily organized and 
regulated industries.36 Unions shift the compensation package from cash 
wages to fringe benefits.37 Overall, they reduce inequality in the distribu-
tion of wages among workers.38 By providing workers with an institutional 
voice, unions reduce turnover.39 In economic downturns, they replace ter-
minations with temporary layoffs, followed by recalls instead of new hires, 
as times improve.40 They negotiate for rules, such as seniority-based deci-
sions, that reduce management subjectivity but also management flexibil-
ity.41 The union-threat effect raises the wages of blue-collar workers in 
non-union firms but does not affect non-unionized white-collar workers.42
Unions galvanize worker discontent to strengthen their positions in bar-
gaining, resulting in unionized workers reporting less job satisfaction than 
their non-unionized counterparts.43 Unions increase productivity through 
lower turnover rates, improve managerial performance in response to union 
effects, and cooperative labor-management relations.44 Productivity suffers, 
however, when labor-management relations are poor. Unions reduce profit-
ability as unionized firms earn a lower rate of return on capital than their 
non-unionized counterparts.45 Unions have had mixed success when it 
 35.  RICAHRD B. FREEMAN & JAMES L. MEDOFF, WHAT DO UNIONS DO? 20–22 (1985) (summa-
rizing findings). 
 36.  Id. at 48-50. 
 37.  Id. at 64. 
 38.  Id. at 78-93. 
 39.  Id. at 95-96, 103-10. 
 40.  Id. at 112-21. 
 41.  Id. at 122-33. 
 42.  Id. at 150-61.
 43.  Id. at 136-49. 
 44.  Id. at 165-72.
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comes to political influence with much of their legislative success in en-
actment of laws that benefit workers as a whole rather than just unions or 
unionized workers.46 Unions tend to be highly democratic institutions, es-
pecially at the local level.47
Thirty years later, sociologist Jake Rosenfeld chronicled the decline in 
union density and the erosion of the union wage effect.48 According to 
Rosenfeld, unions no longer influence the compensation paid to non-union 
workers, with private sector unions largely confined to forestalling wage 
declines among their members.49 Low wage workers and workers lacking a 
college education have been particularly hard hit in many ways. Opportuni-
ties for advancement have eroded, and there is no institution mediating the 
effects of automation and technological change on the most vulnerable 
workers. The decline of unions has also resulted in a decline of civic en-
gagement among less educated lower-paid workers. Overall, there has been 
a dramatic shift in power away from workers and toward employers.50
When one views the dramatic decline in union density and its impact 
on employees’ working lives, it is easy to understand the shift in attention 
to alternatives to traditional unions. However, we should not lose sight of 
the fact that traditional unions still perform many of the important functions 
that Freeman and Medoff chronicled, even in their weaker state. 
Traditional labor remains the dominant vehicle for democratizing the 
workplace. To serve as exclusive bargaining representatives, unions must 
be freely and fairly designated or selected by a majority of the workers in 
the bargaining unit. It is illegal for employers to grant exclusive representa-
tion recognition to unions who lack majority support.51 Once recognized as 
exclusive representatives, unions have a duty to represent all workers in the 
bargaining unit fairly, including those who oppose union representation.52
Unions are legally required to run their organizations democratically. Un-
ion members have equal rights to nominate candidates for union office, 
vote in elections and referenda, attend and participate in membership meet-
ings, and vote in membership meetings.53 Union members are guaranteed 
 46.  Id. at 191-206. 
 47.  Id. at 210-13. 
 48.  JAKE ROSENFELD, WHAT UNIONS NO LONGER DO (2014). 
 49.  Id. at 74-79. 
 50.  Id. at 163-81. 
 51.  Int’l Ladies Garment Workers Union v. NLRB, 366 U.S. 731, 738 (1961). 
 52.  Air Line Pilots Ass’n v. O’Neill, 499 U.S. 65, 75 (1991); Vaca v. Sipes, 386 U.S. 171, 177 
(1967); Humphrey v. Moore, 375 U.S. 335, 342 (1964); Ford Motor Co. v. Huffman, 345 U.S. 330, 337 
(1953); Steele v. Louisville & Nashville RR, 323 U.S. 192, 202 (1944). 
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the freedom of speech and assembly in internal union affairs.54 Local un-
ions must elect their officers by secret ballot at least every three years.55
Intermediate bodies must elect their officers at least every four years by 
secret ballot or by delegates elected by secret ballot.56 Nationals and inter-
nationals must elect their officers at least every five years by secret ballot 
or delegates selected by secret ballot.57 Union members have the right to 
nominate candidates, run for office, and vote.58 Unions and employers are 
prohibited from financing candidates’ campaigns.59 Candidates have the 
right to have the union distribute their literature at their expense.60 Union 
officials owe fiduciary duties to the union and its members.61
In the private sector, the union-wage effect may be weakened, but it 
remains. The Economic Policy Institute found in 2003 that unions raised 
workers’ wages by 20% and overall compensation by 28%.62 A wide varie-
ty of studies have estimated the union wage effect as being between 10% 
and 20%.63 The reduction in union representation rates since then has likely 
reduced the union wage effect, but it has not eliminated it. According to the 
Bureau of Labor Statistics, in 2018, union-represented employees earned 
median weekly wages of $1,042 compared to $860 for non-union repre-
sented workers.64 A recent report from the UC Berkeley Center for Labor 
Research and Education found that, in California, union-represented work-
ers earn an average of 12.9% more than non-union workers with similar 
demographic characteristics and working in similar industries.65 The union 
effect continues to extend to fringe benefits. The California study found 
that workers in unionized workplaces were 37.2% more likely to be cov-
ered by an employment-based health insurance plan than similarly situated 
 54.  Id. § 411(a)(2). 
 55.  Id. § 481(b). 
 56.  Id. § 481(d). 
 57.  Id. § 481(a). 
 58.  Id. § 481(e). 
 59.  Id. § 481(g). 
 60.  Id. § 481(c). 
 61.  Id. § 501. 
 62.  Lawrence Mishel & Matthew Walters, How Unions Help All Workers, ECON. POL’Y INST. 2 
(Aug. 2003), epi.org/files/page/-/old/briefingpapers/143/bp143.pdf [https://perma.cc/6QEY-76R6]. 
 63.  Id. at 2–4. 
 64.  U.S. Bureau Lab. Stats., Median Weekly Earnings of Full-time Wage and Salary Workers by 
Union Affiliation and Selected Characteristics, U.S. DEP’T LAB.
https://www.bls.gov/news.release/union2.t02.htm [https://perma.cc/HW98-GM7V]. 
 65.  Ken Jacobs & Sarah Thomason, The Union Effect in California #1: Wages, Benefits and Use 
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non-unionized workers.66 It also found that unionized workers were 51.5% 
more likely than similarly situated non-union workers to have access to an 
employment-based retirement plan.67
Service-oriented business unions continue to negotiate for rules that 
protect workers from management’s subjective decision-making and, by 
reducing management flexibility, protect workers and incentivize manage-
ment to find creative solutions instead of taking the path of least resistance. 
In the words of Clyde Summers, unions continue “to protect employees 
against bureaucratic controls which generate disagreeable working condi-
tions.”68 As an example, consider scheduling. 
Several years ago, I presided in an arbitration between a hotel and the 
union that represented its employees. The arbitration was over management 
performing bargaining unit work in room service. The greatest demand for 
room service is by far at breakfast. Furthermore, the demand can fluctuate 
daily, based on hotel occupancy, conferences in the hotel serving breakfast, 
and even the weather. The need for room service workers probably begins 
around 5:00 a.m. to set up for the rush of orders that probably begin at 6:00 
a.m. The need for workers increases as the morning progresses and the 
number of orders increase, but by 10:00 a.m., the need is probably down to 
a few workers, if any. The path of least resistance is to schedule workers 
for as few hours as management anticipates they will be needed for set-up, 
delivery, and clean-up. At most, a worker would be scheduled for five 
hours (5:00 to 10:00 a.m.) and many will be scheduled for fewer hours. 
When need declines, unneeded workers will be sent home. Others may be 
on call to come in if needed with very little notice. 
The collective bargaining agreement, however, did not allow man-
agement to take the path of least resistance. The union had negotiated for a 
guarantee of eight hours of work. The contract did not allow management 
to schedule workers for fewer than eight hours. It did, however, allow man-
agement to assign room service workers other tasks. Consequently, after 
the morning room service rush, many room service workers tended to the 
refreshments the hotel offered guests in its lobby, did set-up work for 
lunches that guests had ordered for meetings they were holding in hotel 
meeting rooms and in their suites, and other related tasks. Denying man-
agement the path of least resistance incentivized management to find effi-
cient uses of personnel that it otherwise would have just sent home. 
Moreover, recognition that the employer would strongly resist an eight-
 66.  Id. at 3. 
 67.  Id. at 4. 
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hour work guarantee incentivized the union to agree on additional tasks that 
management could assign to room service workers after the morning break-
fast rush. 
The hotel used scheduling software to forecast how many room ser-
vice workers it would need each day on the weekly schedule. (The contract 
required management to post weekly schedules by a specified day of the 
prior week.) The software worked well, but on occasion, management’s 
forecast was too low, and room service orders backed up. In those circum-
stances, managers from all over the hotel were called to the kitchen to as-
sist with preparation of room service trays and delivery to guest rooms. 
That prompted the grievance that was arbitrated before me because the 
contract provided that managers could not perform bargaining unit work 
except in emergencies. The issue before me was whether these shortages 
amounted to an emergency. I held they did not and awarded that the hotel 
pay the employees who would have been scheduled had management not 
performed the work. Again, traditional service-oriented business unionism 
denied management the path of least resistance. 
Another example comes from the airline industry. As related by Kath-
erine Stone, flight attendant unions and airlines have negotiated schedule 
bidding procedures dating to the 1940s. Airlines prepare rosters of schedule 
assignments each month, each containing many series of flight segments 
that begin and end at the attendant’s home base. Some assignments include 
periods that the attendant is on call with a minimum hour guarantee. Flight 
attendants bid for the schedules based on seniority.69
As union density has declined, more workers are at the mercy of em-
ployers taking the path of least resistance to scheduling. This has fueled a 
call for fair scheduling ordinances and statutes. Such one-size-fits-all solu-
tions are inherently inferior to the solutions negotiated by traditional unions 
and employers that are tailored to the needs of the specific workplace. But 
even if such statutes are enacted, they are not likely to be very helpful to 
workers if they are not respected or enforced. In all aspects of work regu-
lated by statute, unionized workers are more likely to be aware of their 
statutory rights, to assert those rights, and employers are more likely to 
respect those rights. 
 69.  Katherine V.W. Stone, Unions in the Precarious Economy: How Collective Bargaining Can 
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For example, unionized workers are half as likely as their non-union 
counterparts to be victims of minimum wage violations.70 A study found 
that between 1996 and 2000, unionized workers were significantly more 
likely to be aware of their rights under the Family and Medical Leave Act 
than their non-union counterparts.71 Unionized workers are more likely to 
take advantage of workers’ compensation benefits72 and unemployment 
compensation.73 Enforcement of the Occupational Safety and Health Act 
increases significantly with unionization.74 As Mishel and Walters explain: 
Government agencies charged with the enforcement of regulations can-
not monitor every workplace nor automate the issuance of insurance 
claims resulting from unemployment or injury. In practice, the effective-
ness of implementation of labor protections depends on the worker’s de-
cision to act. This is done either by reporting an abuse or filing a claim. 
Unions have been crucial in this aspect by giving workers the relevant 
information about their rights and the necessary procedures, but also by 
facilitating action by limiting employer reprisals, correcting disinfor-
mation, aggregating multiple claims, providing resources to make a 
claim, and negotiating solutions to disputes on behalf of workers.75
Collective bargaining agreements play a role in advancing public 
health. A recent study found “that union contract language advances many 
of the social determinants of health, including income, security, time off, 
access to healthcare, workplace safety culture, training and mentorship, 
predictable scheduling to ensure time with friends and family, democratic 
participation and engagement with management.”76 Traditional labor still 
 70.  DAVID COOPER & TERESA KROEGER, ECON. POLICY INST., EMPLOYERS STEAL BILLIONS
FROM WORKERS’ PAYCHECKS EACH YEAR 27–28 (May 10, 2017), https://www.epi.org/files/pdf/ 
125116.pdf [https://perma.cc/9RQR-BY6]. 
 71.  Amit Kramer, Unions as Facilitators of Employment Rights: An Analysis of Individuals’ 
Awareness of Parental Leave in the National Longitudinal Survey of Youth, 47 INDUS. REL. 651, 654 
(2008). 
 72.  See Barry Y. Hirsch, David A. Macpherson & J. Michael DuMond, Workers’ Compensation 
Recipiency in Union and Nonunion Workplaces, 50 INDUS. & LAB. REL. REV. 213, 213 (1997). 
 73.  John W. Budd & Nrian P. McCall, The Effect of Unions on the Receipt of Unemployment 
Insurance Benefits, 50 INDUS. & LAB. REL. REV. 478, 478 (1997). 
 74.  David Weil, Enforcing OSHA: The Role of Labor Unions, 30 INDUS. REL. 20, 34 (1991). 
 75.  Mishel & Walters, supra note 62, at 11. A significant example of traditional business union-
ism working cooperatively with management to provide for effective enforcement of non-
discrimination rights is the system established by SEIU Local 32BJ and the Realty Advisory Board 
(which represents unionized building owners and managers in New York City) that was at issue before 
the Court in 14 Penn Plaza, LLC v. Pyett, 556 U.S. 247 (2009). The parties maintain that their system of 
mediating and, if necessary, arbitrating workers’ statutory discrimination claims, provides a forum 
which effectively resolves claims of these low wage workers which would never be brought in the 
regular legal system because of their low dollar value. See Terry Meginniss & Paul Salvatore, The 
Forum for Litigation of Statutory Employment Claims After Pyett: A New Approach from Management 
and Labor, 66 ANN. MTG. NAT’L ACAD. ARBITRATORS 271 (2013).
 76.  Jenn Hagedorn et al., The Role of Labor Unions in Creating Working Conditions That Pro-
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plays a vital role in the well-being of American workers. The question aris-
es whether alt labor can fill the gap in a similar way for the approximately 
90% of workers who lack union representation. I turn to this in the next 
part. 
IV. CAN ALT LABOR FILL THE GAP?
When we think of alt labor, we think of worker centers that are at the 
core of alternatives to traditional labor unions. “Worker centers are com-
munity-based mediating institutions that provide support to low wage 
workers.”77 Janice Fine’s landmark study found that 56% of worker centers 
were industry-specific, while 44% were focused on specific geographic 
areas.78 Worker centers have recovered unpaid wages for many low wage 
workers. They have done so through litigation but also through demonstra-
tions, boycotts, shaming, and other pressures applied to the offender.79
Because worker centers are not labor organizations, they are able to engage 
in tactics, such as secondary boycotts, that unions are not.80
For example, the Workplace Project in Hempstead, New York, in its 
first seven years of existence recovered over $562,000 for workers in back 
pay and benefits.81 When employers found liable refused to pay, Work-
place Project would picket them at their homes, a tactic that could be very 
effective.82 In 2013, it was reported that the Restaurant Opportunities Cen-
ter (ROC) had recovered $6,500,000 in back wages since its inception in 
2001.83 Arise Chicago reports that, in its existence, it has recovered more 
than $6,300,000 for more than 4,000 workers.84 Unpaid wages is by far the 
 77.  JANICE FINE, WORKER CENTERS: ORGANIZING COMMUNITIES AT THE EDGE OF THE DREAM 2 
(2006). 
 78.  Id. at 20–21. 
 79.  See, e.g., Josh Eidelson, Alt Labor, AM. PROSPECT (Jan. 29, 2013), 
https://prospect.org/notebook/alt-labor/ [perma.cc/3TCS-8XPN] (describing actions of the Restaurant 
Opportunities Center). 
 80.  See Kati L. Griffith & Leslie C. Gates, Worker Centers: Labor Policy and a Carrot, Not a 
Stick, 14 HARV. L. & POL’Y REV. 601 (2019); but see Worker Group that Took on Target is Union, 
Labor Department Says, DAILY LAB. REP. (Nov. 19, 2019) (reporting that the U.S. Department of 
Labor has determined that Centro de Trabajadores Unido en Lucha which pressured big box retailers to 
adopt “responsible contractor policies” which led to the unionization of janitorial contractors is a labor 
organization). 
 81.  Janice Fine, Community Unions and the Revival of the American Labor Movement, 33 POL. &
SOC’Y 153, 165 (2005). 
 82.  Id. 
 83.  Eidelson, supra note 79. 
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most common complaint that workers bring to worker centers and is often 
the predominant one.85
Worker center accomplishments in bringing wage thieves to justice 
are impressive, but they cannot substitute for traditional labor unions. For 
one thing, most worker centers lack the capacity to handle the demand for 
action against wage theft. “Some worker centers have to limit the outreach 
they do because they cannot satisfy the demand for services, especially 
with filing unpaid wage claims.”86 Indeed, most worker centers operate on 
a much smaller scale than groups like Arise Chicago and ROC. They seek 
and obtain what Tom Juravich calls “small justice.”87 Such acts of small 
justice, although important, do not lead to sustainable vehicles for improv-
ing workers’ employment lives. As Juravich observes, 
Not to diminish what back pay means to an individual low-wage worker, 
but the solutions are, for the most part, individualized, short-term resolu-
tion to violations that have already occurred. They are not about estab-
lishing contracts or rules for future work or altering power relations, nor 
are they about collective rights moving forward. They are stopgap 
measures.88
The demand for legal services can overwhelm a worker center, and 
some workers will not stay involved after their claims have been re-
solved.89 Some larger scale organizations like ROC have parlayed wage 
enforcement actions into broader agreements with some employers that 
provide benefits and grievance procedures.90 But even there, they seem to 
accumulate individual victories rather than sustained institutions for better-
ing their constituents’ working lives.91 And moving beyond enforcement of 
minimum standards is difficult because “[o]nce you’ve raised a work-
place’s standards from outrageous to acceptable, it’s harder to enlist politi-
cians or consumers in a campaign for further progress.”92
One way in which worker centers succeed is by fostering alliances 
with public enforcement agencies. Such alliances, however, are at the mer-
 85.  See FINE, supra note 77, at 73 (reporting, for example, that at the Korean Immigrant Workers 
Advocates, 86% of the disputes that the center handled were wage-related). 
 86.  Id. at 49. 
 87.  Tom Juravich, Constituting Challenges in Differing Arenas of Power: Worker Centers, the 
Fight for Fifteen and Union Organizing, 43 LAB. STUD. J. 104, 110 (2018).  
 88.  Id. 
 89.  FINE, supra note 77, at 77. 
 90.  Eidelson, supra note 79. 
 91.  See id. (“‘When you have these agreements,’ [Cornell’s Kate Bronfenbrener] says, ‘they don’t 
keep organizing.’ Thus, ‘they’ll have to keep fighting the same fight every time a new employer comes 
in or a new supervisor comes in . . . unless they actually get unionized.’”). 
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cy of political changes. For example, when a Republican was elected gov-
ernor in Illinois in 2014, the approach of the previously supportive Illinois 
Department of Labor changed considerably.93
A major limitation for most worker centers is their dependence on 
foundations for funding. A 2006 study found that worker centers received 
only 2% of their budgets from member dues.94 Worker centers appear to 
get more than 60% of their budgets from foundations.95 Reliance on foun-
dations appears to be growing. The Chamber of Commerce reported that 
from 2009 to 2012, foundations gave $55,398,000 to worker centers, but 
from 2013 to 2016, they gave $106,333,100.96 Reliance on foundation sup-
port is unpredictable, making planning challenging.97 Reliance on founda-
tion support also means that worker centers are constantly on the lookout 
for new sources of support, sometimes adding activities or programs that 
make little sense other than to become eligible for a particular grant.98
Most worker centers view membership as a privilege that must be 
earned, and consequently, few regularly collect dues.99 This is in contrast to 
traditional unions where membership is obtained by being in a bargaining 
unit represented by the union and paying dues. And union membership 
comes with rights to participate and vote in union affairs.100 Union mem-
bership rights promotes accountability of union leaders and staff to the 
membership. In contrast, because worker centers tend not to ask for signifi-
cant support from the workers themselves, they “never have to face up to 
the question of how deeply situated in their communities and valued by 
their constituencies they really are.”101
In contrast to unions that are run by democratically elected officers, 
most worker centers are organized as not-for-profit corporations run by 
 93.  Michael M. Oswalt & César Rosado Marzán, Organizing the State: The “New Labor Law” 
Seen from the Bottom-Up, 39 BERKELEY J. LAB. & EMP. L. 415, 450 (2018). 
 94.  See Shayna Storm, Organizing’s Business Model Problem, CENTURY FOUNDATION REPORT 2 
(Oct. 26, 2016), https://tcf.org/content/report/organizings-business-model-problem/ [https://perma.cc/U 
6MW-5EEL].  
 95.  Id. at 4; FINE, supra note 77, at 254. 
 96.  JACOB B. MANHEIM, THE EMERGING ROLE OF WORKER CENTERS IN UNION ORGANIZING: AN
UPDATE AND SUPPLEMENT 13 (Dec. 6, 2017), https://www.uschamber.com/report/the-emerging-role-
worker-centers-union-organizing-update-and-supplement [https://perma.cc/KXL6-2BE4]. 
 97.  FINE, supra note 77, at 255. Indeed, a recent study showed that worker centers, regardless of 
size, have very uneven revenues. Leslie C. Gates et al., Sizing Up Worker Center Income (2008-2014): 
A Study of Revenue, Size, Stability and Streams, NO ONE SIZE FITS ALL: WORKER ORGANIZATION,
POLICY AND MOVEMENT FOR A NEW ECONOMIC AGE 39, 44–49 (Janice Fine et al. eds. 2018). 
 98.  FINE, supra note 77, at 255.
 99.  Id. at 14. 
 100.  See supra notes 53-60 and accompanying text. 
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officers who report to a self-perpetuating board of trustees. The lack of 
membership accountability may have led to a schism between board mem-
bers and the executive director and other staff that proved to be the down-
fall of the Workplace Project.102 Of course, as the current scandal reaching 
to the highest levels of the United Auto Workers demonstrates, unions are 
not immune from officials’ misconduct. But the democratic processes im-
posed by law on labor unions provides a level of accountability not present 
in most worker centers. Indeed, the Senate Select Committee on Improper 
Activities in the Labor and Management Field, better known as the 
McClellan Committee for its Chair Senator John McClellan, whose hear-
ings led to enactment of the Labor Management Reporting and Disclosure 
Act, regarded internal union democracy as an antidote to corrupt union 
practices. The committee reported, “[m]uch that is elicited in the commit-
tee’s findings of misconduct by union officials can be substantially im-
proved . . . by a revitalization of the democratic processes of labor 
unions.”103
Examination of two of the most effective and successful alt labor 
groups shows that they function much like traditional labor unions. One of 
the most successful is the Fair Food Program of the Coalition of Immoka-
lee Workers (CIW).104 Under the program, participating buyers of tomatoes 
pay an additional penny per pound to enable growers to increase pay to 
tomato pickers.105 Participating buyers agree not to patronize growers who 
are not compliant with the program.106 The program includes a code of 
conduct to which growers must adhere, which forbids forced labor and 
sexual assault and requires payment for all hours worked.107 There are 
health and safety committees on every farm and a separate organization, 
the Fair Food Standards Council (FFSC) which operates a 24-hour hot line, 
audits, and monitors participating growers and purchasers to ensure com-
pliance.108
 102.  See Francisco Manrique, The Fall of Long Island’s Workplace Project, VOICES OF NY (Jan. 
2, 2013), https://voicesofny.org/2013/01/the-fall-of-long-islands-workplace-project [https://perma.cc/S4 
8V-32YE]. 
 103.  S. REP. NO. 1417, at 452 (1958). 
 104.  Fair Food Program, COALITION OF IMMOKALEE WORKERS, http://ciw-online.org/fair-food-
program/ [https://perma.cc/7AWL-LXEG]. 
 105.  Campaign for Fast Food, COALITION OF IMMOKALEE WORKERS, http://ciw-
online.org/campaign-for-fair-food/. 
 106.  Fair Food 2018 Update, FAIR FOODS STANDARDS COUNCIL 3 (Oct. 3, 2019), 
https://www.fairfoodprogram.org/wp-content/uploads/2019/10/Fair-Food-Program-2018-SOTP-
Update-Final.pdf. 
 107.  Fair Food Code of Conduct, FAIR FOODS STANDARDS COUNCIL, http://www.fairfoodstandard 
s.org/resources/fair-food-code-of-conduct/ (last visited Feb. 13, 2020) [https://perma.cc/ENR9-TKTZ]. 
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Before CIW’s action, it was common for workers to be picked up and 
driven to the fields but not allowed to clock in for several hours until it was 
time to pick tomatoes. They worked without rest breaks in ninety-five-
degree heat and women were sexually assaulted.109 CIW engaged in a four-
year boycott of Taco Bell, which pressured its parent company, Yum 
Brands, which also owns KFC and Pizza Hut, to agree to pay the penny a 
pound extra to growers who would comply with the program. It signed up 
McDonald’s, Burger King, Subway, and Chipotle and then moved on to 
sign up retailers such as Whole Foods, Trader Joe’s, and Wal-Mart. The 
extra penny per pound appears on workers’ paychecks as a bonus.110 CIW 
claims the FFP covers 90% of the Florida tomato growers,111 a density 
level that any union would envy. 
The FFSC has its own board, executive director, and staff. It boasts of 
handling 1,800 hotline complaints, as of 2017 and of resolving 53% within 
two weeks and 70% within one month.112 Complaints and audits enforce 
the Code of Conduct which prohibits forced labor, child labor, and sexual 
harassment and violence. The Code mandates growers’ cooperation with 
audits and that workers be allowed to speak freely. The complaint hotline 
number must be provided on workers’ pay slips. All workers must be hired 
as employees and placed on the grower’s payroll before work begins. 
Growers must maintain detailed records of worker injuries, workers com-
pensation claims, training, and discipline. All workers must participate on 
the clock in CIW education sessions each growing cycle. Growers must 
adhere to progressive discipline. Growers must have accurate timekeeping 
systems and must hold monthly safety committee meetings with at least 
five worker representatives and at least one representative from each 
crew.113
CIW has thus developed practices and processes that are analogous to 
those developed by traditional service-oriented business unions. The Code 
and the penny per pound bonus are analogous to traditional collective bar-
gaining agreements. They are enforced through the complaint hot line and 
the FFSC’s adjudication and audits which take the place of shop stewards 
 109.  Steven Greenhouse, In Florida Tomato Fields a Penny Buys Progress, N.Y. TIMES (Apr. 24, 
2014), https://www.nytimes.com/2014/04/25/business/in-florida-tomato-fields-a-penny-buys-
progress.html [https://perma.cc/L53M-NJDN]. 
 110.  Fair Food Program: Frequently Asked Questions, COALITION OF IMMOKALEE WORKERS,
http://ciw-online.org/ffp_faq/ (last visited Feb. 13, 2020) [https://perma.cc/EB76-UM3S]. 
 111.  Id. 
 112.  Fair Food 2017 Annual Report, FAIR FOODS STANDARDS COUNCIL 36 (Apr. 17, 2018), 
http://www.fairfoodprogram.org/wp-content/uploads/2018/06/Fair-Food-Program-2017-Annual-
Report-Web.pdf. 
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and grievance procedures found in traditional CBAs. CIW thus has created 
a stable and sustainable bureaucracy that safeguards worker rights. This is 
not a case like other worker centers where the center just moves from com-
plaint to complaint as the CIW program goes way beyond pursuing claims 
of wage theft. 
But CIW has no members and collects no member dues. The FFSC is 
funded by the growers and purchasers. The CIW itself appears heavily 
dependent on foundation funding. The Chamber of Commerce report 
shows that CIW received $1,900,000 in foundation support from 2013 to 
2016.114 Thus, unlike traditional unions, CIW does not appear to have 
brought democratic processes to the workers it represents. 
Another very successful alt labor group is the New York Taxi Work-
ers Alliance (NYTWA). At one time, taxi drivers were often unionized. 
They were employees of the taxi companies and paid a percentage of the 
fares they collected plus tips received. However, the taxi companies 
changed their business models, moving to a system where drivers lease 
their cabs and do not account to the companies for fares received or driving 
activity. The courts held that such drivers were independent contractors and 
accordingly, they are no longer covered by the National Labor Relations 
Act.115 The taxi unions were broken. 
The NYTWA was founded in 1998. It has organized taxi drivers and 
led collective action, including strikes and publicity campaigns, and suc-
cessfully pressured the New York Taxi and Limousine Commission (TLC) 
to enact or amend rules in ways that benefit the drivers. Because the TLC 
largely controls driver incomes and working conditions through its regula-
tions, it occupies a position similar to a traditional employer. The NYTWA 
effectively engages in collective bargaining with the TLC and other author-
ities who control drivers’ working conditions and revenues.116
The NYTWA stands out from other worker centers because it is not 
excessively dependent on foundation or other outside funding. It received 
only $450,000 from foundations during 2013-2016.117 It boasts 21,000 
members,118 and membership dues account for the largest share of its reve-
nues. Thus, NYTWA looks very much like a traditional labor union. In-
 114.  MANHEIM, supra note 96, at 49, tbl 8. 
 115.  See, e.g., NLRB v. Associated Diamond Cabs, Inc., 702 F.2d 912 (11th Cir. 1983); Seafarers 
Local 777 v. NLRB (Yellow Cab Co), 603 F.2d 862 (7th Cir. 1978); SuperShuttle DFW, Inc., 367 
N.L.R.B. No. 75, at 3 (Jan. 25, 2019) (collecting cases).  
 116.  See Hannah Johnston, Workplace Gains beyond the Wagner Act: The New York Taxi Workers 
Alliance and Participation in Administrative Rulemaking, 43 LAB. STUD. J. 141, 146–57 (2017). 
 117.  MANHEIM, supra note 96, at 51, tbl 8. 





      06/12/2020   13:18:38
42394-ckt_95-1 Sheet No. 92 Side A      06/12/2020   13:18:38
7 MALIN MACRO 1 EIC 5.5 (DO NOT DELETE) 5/8/2020 10:43 PM 
2020] ALT LABOR? 175 
deed, it is the first organization representing non-standard workers to be 
affiliated with the AFL-CIO. 
V. IS THERE A WAY FORWARD?
The comments of scholars and activists effectively giving up on tradi-
tional business unionism and collective bargaining that I noted at the be-
ginning of this article,119 are not new. More than a quarter century ago, in 
an article in this law review, long-time union lawyer and Georgetown Uni-
versity law professor Michael Gottesman expressed his despair at the fail-
ure of the NLRA and the economic conditions that precluded its revival.120
The concerns he raised were comparable to those raised by Jonathan Ros-
enblum. Gottesman acknowledged that the NLRA fails to incentivize em-
ployers to abide by the law and respect their workers’ rights to engage in 
collective action.121 But changing the law to deter employer violations of 
the statute, in Gottesman’s view, would not revive worker collective repre-
sentation because worker fear went beyond fear of employer retaliation. He 
wrote: 
The fear that grips workers today is not that they will be fired or perma-
nently replaced, but that their jobs will disappear. They worry that their 
employer will lose out in the competitive world and go under, or that the 
investors will move their capital (and thus the jobs) to another locale 
(perhaps another country) whose lower wage scales enable more effec-
tive competition. Having absorbed this message, workers today have be-
come persuaded that the key to the survival of their jobs is that their 
employer be an effective competitor – including, if necessary, a competi-
tor based on lower labor costs.122
The fear erodes worker solidarity, converting it into a race to the bot-
tom. Gottesman elaborated: 
Today, employees do not expect that all employees in an industry today 
will survive. The fittest will survive and they want their employer to be 
in that number. Far from joining a movement for equality among all 
workers in an industry, the endangered worker today is anxious to assure 
that his or her employer has a competitive edge over others in the indus-
try. And, if labor cost competition is necessary to facilitate that edge, 
well, it’s better than losing one’s job altogether.123
  119.  See supra notes 6-8 and accompanying text. 
 120.  Michael H. Gottesman, In Despair, Starting Over: Imagining a Labor Law for Unorganized 
Workers, 69 CHI.-KENT L. REV. 59 (1993). 
 121.  Id. at 62-63. 
 122.  Id. at 65. 
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The picture Gottesman (and others) paint is not the picture envisioned 
when the NLRA was enacted. On the contrary, the statute declares: 
The inequality of bargaining power between employees who do not pos-
sess full freedom of association or actual liberty of contract, and em-
ployers who are organized in the corporate or other forms of ownership 
association substantially burdens and affects the flow of commerce, and 
tends to aggravate recurrent business depressions by depressing wage 
rates and the purchasing power of wage earners in industry . . . .124
By empowering workers to act collectively, the NLRA’s goal was to 
enable workers to eliminate the competition among themselves that drove 
their wages and working conditions down. The alternative was to have the 
government set terms and conditions of employment. In rejecting that al-
ternative, Congress took a conservative approach by affording workers a 
mechanism to pool their collective bargaining power and engage in a pri-
vate ordering that improves their compensation and their purchasing pow-
er.125
The concerns raised by many from Gottesman to Rosenblum and oth-
ers is that collective worker power has eroded so much that, instead of tak-
ing labor costs out of competition, collective bargaining has been 
transformed into a race to the bottom. Further erosion of solidarity occurs 
when workers caught in the race to the bottom resent workers who have 
escaped it. As labor journalist Steven Greenhouse has articulated, quoting 
his grandmother’s reaction to the campaign by Wisconsin Governor Scott 
Walker to decimate public employee collective bargaining in that state, 
When I was growing up, people used to say, “Look at the good wages 
and benefits that people in a union have. I want to join a union.” Now 
people say, “Look at the good wages and benefits that union members 
have. They’re getting more than what I get. That’s not fair. Let’s take 
away some of what they have.”126
In an environment in which collective market power is replaced by a 
competitive race to the bottom and solidarity is replaced by resentment it is 
not surprising that alt labor movements have turned to increased reliance on 
government-mandated minimum standards, such as a higher minimum 
wage and paid sick leave and fair scheduling legislation, and to enforce-
ment of those standards through worker centers. But, as discussed previ-
ously, the need for enforcement greatly exceeds the capacity of worker 
 124.  29 U.S.C. § 151 (1947). 
 125.  See Martin H. Malin, The Canadian Auto Workers – Magna International, Inc. Framework of 
Fairness Agreement: A U.S. Perspective, 54 ST. L. UNIV. L.J. 525, 549 (2010). 
 126.  STEVEN GREENHOUSE, BEATEN DOWN, WORKED UP: THE PAST, PRESENT, AND FUTURE OF 
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centers.127 Worker center concentration on enforcing minimum standards 
legislation does not lead to sustainable improvements in workers’ lives.128
And although efforts to improve statutory minimum standards, led by the 
Fight for Fifteen, have had a fair degree of success, the federal minimum 
wage has been stuck at $7.25 for more than ten years.129 There has been 
considerable improvement in minimum standards at the state and local 
level, but that improvement has been uneven and, in the case of some mu-
nicipal ordinances, has been preempted by state statutes.130 This begs the 
question: are we left in the despair of which Professor Gottesman spoke 
twenty-six years ago? 
There is reason to believe that the picture is not so bleak. Workers still 
desire union representation in significant numbers. Despite the picture that 
unionization increases labor costs and, thereby, threatens job security, the 
surveys conducted by Kochan and colleagues found that almost half of 
non-managerial, non-unionized workers would vote for union representa-
tion if given the opportunity.131 They conclude that “if all of the non-union 
workers who have a desire to join a union had the opportunity to do so, 
union membership would increase by approximately 58 million workers, 
essentially quadrupling the number currently represented by a union, which 
would raise union density to 54%.”132
Public opinion concerning unions is also on the upswing. In the most 
recent Gallup poll, taken August 1 – 14, 2019, 64% of respondents had a 
favorable view of unions, doubling the percentage of respondents with an 
unfavorable view.133 This marked a steady ten-year increase from 2009 
when only 48% responded that they viewed unions favorably.134 These 
developments suggest that Professor Gottesman’s despair that more effec-
 127.  See supra notes 86-87 and accompanying text.  
 128.  See supra notes 88-91 and accompanying text.  
 129.  Wage and Hour Div., Minimum Wage, U.S. DEP’T LAB., https://www.dol.gov/agencies/whd/ 
minimum-wage (last visited Feb. 17, 2020) [https://perma.cc/77B7-VQPJ]. 
 130.  See, e.g., Lewis v. Governor of Ala., 944 F.3d 1287 (11th Cir. 2019) (holding that plaintiffs 
paid at levels below the minimum wage set forth in a Birmingham ordinance lacked standing to sue the 
state of Alabama challenging an Alabama statute that preempted local minimum wage ordinances as 
racially motivated in violation of the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment); David A. 
Graham, How St. Louis Workers Won and Then Lost a Minimum Wage Hike, THE ATLANTIC (Aug. 29, 
2017), https://www.theatlantic.com/business/archive/2017/08/st-louis-minimum-wage-preemption 
/538182/ (discussing how Missouri state statute preempted St. Louis ordinance increasing minimum 
wage several months after the ordinance took effect) [https://perma.cc/BXB7-BLED]. 
 131.  Kochan et al., supra note 2, at 20. 
 132.  Id. at 23. 
 133.  Labor Unions, GALLUP, http://news.gallup.com/poll/12751/labor-unions.aspx?version=print 
(last visited Feb. 17, 2010).  
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tive enforcement of the NLRA would not appreciably increase worker rep-
resentation may not hold today. 
Unfortunately, statutory reform is not likely to happen. Except for a 
few minor changes in the 1970s, all efforts to amend the NLRA since 1959 
have failed.135 Labor and management advocates have had enough political 
power to block every effort at reform made by the other side.136 But there 
are reforms that could have meaningful impact that do not require congres-
sional action. 
A key obstacle to worker organization is the prevalence of unfair labor 
practices committed by employers in response to union organizing activity. 
Chief among these is the discharge of union supporters, which can have a 
devastating impact on an organizing drive. A recent study found that em-
ployers were charged with unfair labor practices in more than 40% of all 
representation election cases before the NLRB in 2016 and 2017.137 In 
between one-fifth and three-tenths of election cases, employers were 
charged with illegally discharging union supporters.138 The record was 
worse for elections in larger bargaining units. For units of sixty or more 
employees, the top quarter of all NLRB elections, employers were charged 
with unfair labor practices in over half of the cases,139 and with discharging 
union supporters in between 27.2% and 41.3% of elections.140 The higher 
prevalence of unfair labor practice charges in elections in larger bargaining 
units is particularly significant because size of the bargaining unit is the 
most significant determinant of election outcome, with the likelihood of a 
union victory decreasing as the number of eligible voters increases.141
 More than twenty years ago, Professor Charles Morris observed the 
extreme differences in union density between the private sector generally 
and the railroad and airline industries which are covered by the Railway 
 135.  See Cynthia L. Estlund, The Ossification of American Labor Law, 102 COLUM. L. REV. 1527, 
1532-35 (2002). 
 136.  See id. at 1540-44.  
 137.  CELINE MCNICHOLAS ET AL., ECON. POLICY INST., UNLAWFUL: U.S. EMPLOYERS ARE 
CHARGED WITH VIOLATING FEDERAL LAW IN 41.5% OF ALL UNION ELECTION CAMPAIGNS 5-6 (Dec. 
11, 2019), https://www.epi.org/files/pdf/179315.pdf. 
 138.  Id. at 7. 
 139.  Id.
 140.  Id. Of course, that charges were filed does not necessarily mean that violations occurred. 
Tabulating the percentage of elections in which charges were filed may thus over-estimate the percent-
age tainted by illegal employer conduct. But that is likely offset by the high probability that many 
violations were never reported and tbhus do not appear in the numbers of charges filed. In any event, 
the study is consistent with prior research on the subject. See id. at 8 (discussing prior studies). 
 141.  See Martin H. Malin & John M. Werner, Submission of Professor Martin H. Malin and 
Professor Jon M. Werner in response to the National Labor Relations Board’s Request for Information 
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Labor Act rather than the NLRA.142 He also observed that, whereas dis-
criminatory discharges were relatively common in organizing campaigns 
under the NLRA, they were very rare under the RLA.143 He suggested the 
reason lay in the different approaches of the two statutes to enforcement of 
their prohibitions on such conduct. Whereas, exclusive enforcement author-
ity under the NLRA rests with the NLRB’s general counsel, the RLA relies 
on private litigation to enforce protections of employee rights. Consequent-
ly, railroad and airlines who discharge union supporters do so knowing that 
they will likely be met with private actions, including requests for prelimi-
nary injunctive relief. This, according to Morris, serves as an effective de-
terrent to discriminatory discharges under the RLA, even though railroads 
and airlines typically mount vigorous campaign to defeat unions seeking 
representation rights.144 He urged that comparable deterrence could be 
achieved under the NLRA by the use of the NLRB’s authority to seek pre-
liminary injunctive relief under section 10(j) of the statute.145 Twenty years 
later, Morris found that the situation had not changed. Union density re-
mained high and stable in the rail and airline industries and continued to 
drop in the private sector generally.146 He refined his proposal, calling for 
the NLRB to delegate the authority to seek 10(j) injunctions to the general 
counsel and streamlining the process to provide for more timely injunction 
petitions.147 Implementation of the Morris proposal would go a long way to 
closing the gap between the percentage of workers who desire union repre-
sentation and the percentage who have it. 
In the same issue of this law review in which Professor Gottesman 
voiced his despair, I offered two other proposed reforms that would not 
require congressional action.148 One proposal went to the representation 
election process. I observed that as it was deciding in Excelsior Underwear, 
Inc. to require employers to furnish lists of employee names and addresses 
when elections are directed, the Board also deferred taking action under its 
authority to regulate representation elections to mandate equal access for 
 142.  Charles J. Morris, A Tale of Two Statutes: Discrimination for Union Activity Under the NLRA 
and RLA, 2 EMP. RTS. & EMP. POL’Y J. 317, 319-20 (1998). 
 143.  Id. 
 144.  Id. at 339-44. 
 145.  Id. at 344-59. 
 146.  Charles J. Morris, A “Tale of Two Statutes” Redux, 40 BERKELEY J. LAB. & EMP. L. 293, 
296-97 (2018). 
 147.  Id. at 345-35. 
 148.  Martin H. Malin, Afterword: Labor Law Reform: Waiting for Congress?, 69 CHI.-KENT L.
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campaigning.149 Consequently, employers remained free to mandate em-
ployee attendance at captive audience anti-union presentations without 
affording the union time to respond. I urged the NLRB to change this via 
rulemaking.150
My second proposal went to another major impediment to workers re-
alizing their desire for union representation: the difficulties in achieving a 
first contract. I observed that the strong reluctance by the NLRB and the 
courts to infer bad faith bargaining from a party’s substantive proposals in 
negotiations was generally appropriate because: 
“[i]f an employer is in good faith unyielding at the bargaining table, 
the union’s remedy is not to seek NLRB assistance but to exert economic 
pressure. . . . The statute does not, and should not, compel an employer to 
make concessions that the union is too weak to force.”151
Union economic pressure primarily involves a strike or threat to strike. 
A union’s strike weapon is offset by an employer’s legal freedom to per-
manently replace economic strikers. I urged that permanent replacement or 
the threat thereof could be used as a tool for pressuring the union into 
agreement but it also could be used as a vehicle for breaking the union. 
This possibility is particularly of concern where the parties are negotiating 
their first contact and therefore employer conduct in bargaining warrants 
closer scrutiny in such situations.152
I maintained that charges of failing to bargain in good faith are gener-
ally not about imposing contract terms on a reluctant party. Instead, in 
practice, they are about whether a strike will be classified as an economic 
strike, during which the employer may permanently replace the strikers, or 
an unfair labor practice strike during which permanent replacement is pro-
hibited. 153 I urged, however, that the existing approach to refusals to bar-
gain in good faith was inadequate. I wrote: 
An employer who surface bargains to avoid a first contract in effect 
dares the union to strike, wielding permanent replacement as an explicit 
or implicit threat to the union’s very existence. Employees deterred from 
striking by the specter of permanent replacements taking their jobs are 
not likely to be reassured by the potential for getting their jobs back after 
a prolonged legal fight.154
 149.  Id. at 281 (discussing Excelsior Underwear, Inc., 156 N.L.R.B. 1236 (1966) and General 
Elec. Co., 156 N.L.R.B. 1247 (1966)). 
 150.  Id.
 151.  Id. at 284. 
 152.  Id. at 287-88. 
 153.  Id. at 287. 
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Consequently, I proposed that the NLRB scrutinize employer conduct 
at the bargaining table more closely in first contract negotiations and, upon 
finding a failure to bargain in good faith, remedy the violation not only by 
ordering the employer to cease and desist but also by prohibiting the em-
ployer going forward from permanently replacing the employees should 
they go on strike.155 My reform proposals are as valid today as they were 
twenty-six years ago. Indeed, they are probably more needed today. 
Of course, administrative reforms require administrative officers who 
are sympathetic to worker collective rights and, therefore, are not likely to 
happen under the Trump administration. Indeed, there is a great divide 
between how Democrats and Republicans view labor unions. A 2018 Pew 
Research Center survey found that 68% of Democrats and Democrat-
leaning independents viewed the decline in union representation as a bad 
thing while 53% of Republicans and Republican-leaning independents said 
it is mostly good.156
Today, unions have virtually no support among Republican elected of-
ficials, with most displaying outright hostility. Unions today are almost 
completely aligned with the Democratic Party. It was not always this way. 
It was a Republican governor, Nelson Rockefeller, who created the Taylor 
Commission in 1966 and who a year later signed the Taylor Law giving 
New York public employees rights to organize and bargain collectively.157
In 1983, another Republican governor, James Thompson, signed the bills 
giving Illinois public employees collective bargaining rights. He did so 
after winning reelection by a very narrow margin in 1982 due in large part 
to the support of the Illinois Education Association.158
Labor’s almost complete alignment with the Democratic Party ex-
plains a good deal of the actions by Republican elected officials. When 
Wisconsin enacted Act 10, gutting collective bargaining rights for most 
public employees in 2011, the Wisconsin Senate Majority Leader admitted 
that the goal was to defund President Obama’s reelection campaign in that 
state. He told then Fox News reporter Megan Kelley, “If we win this battle, 
and the money is not there under the auspices of the unions, certainly what 
 155.  Id. at 290. 
 156.  Drew DeSilver, Most Americans View Unions Favorably, Though Few Workers Belong to 
One, PEW RES. CTR. (Aug. 30, 2018), https://www.pewresearch.org/fact-tank/2018/08/30/union-
membership-2/ [https://perma.cc/MT45-52PS]. 
 157.  Mildred Warner, New York State Taylor Law: History, CORNELL U., 
http://www.mildredwarner.org/gov-restructuring/special-projects/taylor-law (last visited Feb. 17, 2020) 
[https://perma.cc/GY7P-KGZR]. 
 158.  See Gregory M. Saltzman, Public Sector Bargaining Laws Really Matter: Evidence from 
Ohio and Illinois, in WHEN PUBLIC SECTOR WORKERS UNIONIZE 41, 51-52 (Richard B. Freeman & 
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you’re going to find is President Obama is going to have a much difficult, 
much more difficult time getting elected and winning the state of Wiscon-
sin.”159 Conservative activist Grover Norquist has declared “If Act 10 is 
enacted in a dozen more states, the modern Democratic Party will cease to 
be a competitive power in American politics. It’s that big a deal.”160 In 
Michigan, the Republican legislature and governor prohibited Michigan 
teachers from paying their union dues by payroll deduction in retaliation 
for the Michigan Education Association’s support to recall Republican 
representatives who backed legislation that the union opposed.161
The politically partisan attacks on unions have gone beyond enactment 
of legislation. When the UAW sought to organize workers at the 
Volkswagen plant in Chattanooga, Tennessee in 2014, the company was 
officially neutral and unofficially welcomed the union because it viewed 
unionization as helpful to its plan to establish a works council at the plant. 
However, the Union lost the NLRB election as Republican officials led by 
Senator Robert Corker and Governor Bill Haslan made threats to workers’ 
job security that if made by the company would have violated the 
NLRA.162 A Republican state representative was blunt in explaining why 
Republican officials did not want to see UAW representation of workers in 
their state. “The UAW does not donate to Republicans . . . . That’s one fear, 
let’s just call it like we see it.”163
That Republican elected officials’ attacks on organized labor are mo-
tivated by political partisanship rather than notions of public policy is re-
flected in how they treat the few unions who support them. Act 10, for 
example, did not apply to public safety employees, but the definition of 
public safety employees coincided with employees represented by unions 
that supported Scott Walker’s campaign and excluded obvious public safe-
 159.  See Steven Greenhouse, The GOP Attack on American Unions Could Cost Democrats the 
2020 Election, WASH. POST (Aug. 28, 2019, 7:52 AM), https://www.washingtonpost.com/outlook/the-
gop-attack-on-american-unions-could-cost-democrats-the-2020-election/2019/08/27/2e5b2992-c465-
11e9-b5e4-54aa56d5b7ce_story.html [https://perma.cc/Q7ML-QCCP]; Lee Fang, WI Senate GOP 
Leader Admits On-Air That His Goal is to Defund Labor Unions, Hurt Obama’s Reelection Chances,
THINK PROGRESS (Mar. 9, 2011, 8:02 PM), https://thinkprogress.org/wi-senate-gop-leader-admits-on-
air-that-his-goal-is-to-defund-labor-unions-hurt-obamas-reelection-d8d554187dbf/ 
[https://perma.cc/9FRD-S34F]. 
 160.  Greenhouse, supra note 159. 
 161.  See Bailey v. Hutchinson, 715 F.3d 956, 958 (6th Cir. 2013) (Stranch, J.dissenting). 
 162.  See Kevin Robillard, UAW Appeals Volkswagen Union Vote, POLITICO (Feb. 21, 2014, 5:02 
PM), https://www.politico.com/story/2014/02/united-auto-workers-union-volkswagen-bob-corker-bill-
haslam-103793 [https://perma.cc/5MZR-FWPS]. 
 163.  Lydia DePillis, Auto Union Loses Historic Election at Volkswagen Plant in Tennessee,
WASH. POST. (Feb. 14, 2014, 9:18 PM), https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/wonk/wp/2014/02/14/ 
united-auto-workers-lose-historic-election-at-chattanooga-volkswagen-plant/ (quoting State Representa-
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ty workers such as the Capitol Police who did not.164 President Trump has 
issued executive orders designed to curb severely the amount of official 
time that federal employee union representatives may receive to represent 
employees and to end the practice of federal agencies providing office 
space and equipment to unions representing their workers.165 But President 
Trump’s administration, reportedly on orders directly from him, has en-
tered into a collective bargaining agreement with the Border Patrol Council 
of the American Federation of Government Employees, the only federal 
employee union that endorsed his candidacy, which gives the union eight 
times the amount of official time it would receive under the executive or-
der.166
The route back to political balance is not clear. However, organized 
labor must find a way to reestablish a civil relationship with the Republican 
Party. 
Unions have been successful in confrontations with employers when 
they have been able to engage the public. This is not a new phenomenon. 
For example, the Teamsters won a major strike against United Parcel Ser-
vice in 1997 in large part because of public support.167 In the current dec-
ade, teacher unions have won several strikes in large part by mobilizing 
public support.168 But, as I have noted previously, labor has also been very 
successful in cooperative efforts with employers in improving the delivery 
of services while also improving the working lives of its members and 
needs to publicize these victories because they do not have the wide visibil-
ity that strikes receive.169
But what of alt labor? In some instances, the successes of alt labor 
groups may be a prelude to a more sustainable traditional labor organiza-
tion. For example, The Sea-Tac campaign for a $15 per hour minimum 
wage also led to the unionization of about 1,000 workers servicing the air-
 164.  Wisc. Educ. Ass’n Council v. Walker, 705 F.3d 640, 642-43 (7th Cir. 2013). 
 165.  Exec. Order No. 13,837, 83 Fed. Reg. 25,335 to 25,336 (May 25, 2018). See Am. Fed. Gov’t 
Emp’ees v. Trump, 929 F.3d 748 (D.C. Cir. 2019) (rejecting challenge to Executive Order). 
 166.  Nick Miroff, Josh Dawsey & Arelis R. Hernandez, With Trump Backing, Border Patrol 




 167.  See Matt Witt & Rand Wilson, The Teamsters UPS Strike of 1997: Building a New Labor 
Movement, 24 LAB. STUD. J. 58 (1999). 
 168.  See, e.g., STEVEN K. ASHBY & ROBERT BRUNO, A FIGHT FOR THE SOUL OF PUBLIC
EDUCATION: THE STORY OF THE CHICAGO TEACHERS STRIKE (2016) (chronicling the Chicago Teachers 
Union strike of 2012). 
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port area.170 Fine relates how the Chicago Interfaith Workers Rights Center 
(now Arise Chicago) facilitated the organization of employees of Berg 
Electronics by the UE and the employer’s recognition of the Union.171
But what of worker centers that opt not to team up with unions to fa-
cilitate the organization of workers for purposes of collective bargaining? 
Are they relegated to pursuing acts of “small justice” that do not lead to 
sustainable vehicles for improving workers’ employment lives?172 They 
need not be as there are roles that they might play that do not amount to 
traditional collective bargaining but also go beyond reacting to redress 
individual injustices and provide sustainability and improvements for 
workers. Gottesman observed that workers in non-union workplaces lack 
the information and expertise to deal meaningfully with their employers. 
He envisioned organizations developing group programs to provide such 
expertise.173 Worker centers that develop or have access to such expertise 
could use it to educate workers and intervene with their employers and 
could also use it to facilitate worker voice with respect to collective goods 
in their workplaces, i.e. matters like safe working conditions, group bene-
fits and grievance processes that individual workers cannot negotiate for on 
their own.174 Indeed, in some respects these are functions that the Coalition 
of Immokalee Workers and the New York Taxi Workers Alliance are 
providing. 
Worker centers that expand to go beyond the small justice of redress-
ing wage theft run a risk that they will be found to be dealing with employ-
ers and, thus, classified as labor organizations subject to the reporting 
requirements and restrictions that the law imposes on unions.175 But the 
risk is worth the trade-off if it means developing into sustainable organiza-
tions that systematically improve worker’s employment lives. 
The paths forward that I have suggested are not likely to be smooth or 
high-speed. They undoubtedly will run into obstacles and some of those 
obstacles may prove to be immovable. I invite others to suggest alterna-
tives. But one matter is clear. The current path we are on is characterized 
by a continuing decline in collective representation of American workers, 
and increased reliance on uneven minimum standards legislation with en-
 170.  See ROSENBLUM, supra note 7, at 157; Passenger Service Workers Ratify First Master Con-
tract at SeaTac, SEIU6 PROP. SERVS. NW (July 25, 2018), http://seiu6.org/category/airport/ 
[https://perma.cc/RE74-A7D2]. 
 171.  FINE, supra note 77, at 129-30. 
 172.  See supra notes 87-88 and accompanying text. 
 173.  Gottesman, supra note 120, at 81-82. 
 174.  See id. at 79-80. 
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forcement falling to over-extended and under-resourced not-for-profit or-
ganizations predominantly dependent on outside funding. The current path 
is not sustainable. We must find something better that embodies the best 
qualities of traditional labor unions. 
